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REDEFINING THE TRIPS AGREEMENT TO ACCOMMODATE EN 
MASSE COMPULSORY LICENSING OF VACCINES & OTHER 
PHARMACEUTICALS FOR THE TREATMENT OF COVID-19 
Alexandra H. Farquhar* 
Globally, over 48 million cases and over one million deaths have 
resulted from the COVID-19 pandemic at the time of this 
publication. Governments and pharmaceutical companies are 
simultaneously racing for effective treatments and vaccines against 
the deadly virus, giving rise to a vaccine nationalism in effort to 
claim a global monopoly on recovery. This Article analyzes the 
possible compulsory licensing fallout over COVID-19 vaccines and 
pharmaceuticals under the current terms of the TRIPS Agreement, 
advocating for clarifying the ambiguous language of TRIPS, 
creating a standardized compensation scheme to patent holders, 
and developing a third-party arbitration mechanism to specifically 
address compulsory licensing disputes over COVID-19 
pharmaceuticals and vaccines. These proposed solutions aim to 
balance the interests of patent holders with the interests of the 
global population.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The current COVID-19 crisis is the most widespread global 
pandemic of this generation.1 Both developed and developing 
countries en masse are desperately seeking pharmaceuticals and 
vaccines to fight the virus.2 There are a number of antivirals and 
vaccines in development for treatment of COVID-19 in the United 
States alone,3 and several more abroad.4 This situation presents an 
opportunity to better define the terms of the international agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
                                                 
 1 Other than HIV/AIDS, which has killed a sobering 35 million people, only the 
Asian Flu and Hong Kong Flu in the 1950s and 1970s had approached the current 
1 million death toll of COVID-19. See Michael S. Rosenwald, History’s Deadliest 
Pandemics, from Ancient Rome to Modern America, WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/local/retropolis/ coronavirus-
deadliest-pandemics/ [https://perma.cc/ZH2H-CUPV]; see WHO Coronavirus 
Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2020), 
https://covid19.who.int/ [https://perma.cc/5EK8-NG69]. 
 2 See Saeed Shah, In Race to Secure Covid-19 Vaccines, World’s Poorest 
Countries Lag Behind, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/article
s/in-race-to-secure-covid-19-vaccines-worlds-poorest-countries-lag-behind-
11598998776 [https://perma.cc/RG2S-H664]. 
 3 Al Root, Here are the Covid-19 Vaccines and Antivirals Being Worked on 




QANN] (Aug. 14, 2020, 7:59 AM). 
 4 See 172 Countries and Multiple Candidate Vaccines Engaged in COVID-19 
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(“TRIPS”).5 TRIPS provisions providing for compulsory licensing6 
were originally included to accommodate epidemics plaguing least-
developed countries7 in need of life-saving therapeutics. However, 
these overly broad provisions meant to provide individual least-
developed countries with flexibility in accessing medicines during 
public health crises are ill-suited to accommodate a pandemic of 
scale like COVID-19. Therefore, it is necessary to rework the 
compulsory licensing provisions within TRIPS to develop a solution 
that would balance the costs of developing an effective vaccine or 
treatment with the benefits of efficiently disseminating those 
pharmaceuticals to all countries in need. This Article explores how 
tighter definitions, standardized compensation schemes, and third-
party arbitration mechanisms could improve TRIPS and craft a more 
practical and workable framework to disseminate curative 
medicines worldwide.  
Part II of this Article examines the compulsory licensing 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. Part III examines the rise of 
vaccine nationalism against the backdrop of World Health 
Organization’s (“WHO”) “Solidarity Call to Action” in the current 
pandemic. Part IV analyzes the consequences and deficiencies of 
current TRIPS compulsory licensing provisions in disseminating a 
vaccine quickly and efficiently on an international scale. Finally, 
Part V suggests possible improvements to the TRIPS Agreement to 
promote greater patent protection and international cooperativity, 
including tighter definitions within the agreement, standardized 
compensation schemes, and third-party arbitration mechanisms. 
                                                 
 5 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1191 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 6 Id. at art. 31. 
 7 “The WTO recognizes as least-developed countries (LDCs) those countries 
which have been designated as such by the United Nations. There are currently 
47 least-developed countries on the UN list, 36 of which to date have become 
WTO members.” Least-developed Countries, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm [https://perma.cc/UF
U9-5PMF] (last visited Oct. 8, 2020). Additionally, “[t]here are no WTO 
definitions of ‘developed’ or ‘developing’ countries,” and these designations are 
self-defined. These Members all benefit from TRIPS. Id. 
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II. TRIPS AGREEMENT – COMPULSORY LICENSING 
TRIPS8 is an international trade agreement between all members 
of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), effective since January 
1, 1995, that sets minimum standards for regulation of intellectual 
property (“IP”) rights, including patents on pharmaceuticals and 
vaccines.9 TRIPS broadly defines intellectual property to include 
copyright, trademarks, and patents.10 While typical patent coverage 
under TRIPS provides for a twenty-year monopoly,11 mirroring the 
U.S. patent system, the drafters also included Article 31 to address 
the humanitarian concerns of accessing technology through 
compulsory licenses12 issued by countries experiencing a “national 
emergency” or other “extreme urgency.”13 Although member 
countries (“Members”) are normally required to first negotiate for a 
voluntary license with a patent holder prior to issuing a compulsory 
license, this requirement may be bypassed by a Member 
experiencing a “national emergency,” such as a public health crisis, 
and instead automatically issue its own compulsory license for the 
needed drug without the permission of the patent holder.14 This 
compulsory license enables the Member licensee to manufacture or 
produce the licensed drug within its borders for use in addressing its 
public health crisis and to determine “adequate remuneration” for 
the patent-holder.15 
                                                 
 8 TRIPS, supra note 5. 
 9 Overview: the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm [https://perma.cc/C4KY-
DFA6] (last visited Sept. 6, 2020). 
 10 TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 1.2. 
 11 Id. at art. 33. 
 12 A compulsory license is “when a government allows someone else to produce 
a patented product or process without the consent of the patent owner or plans to 
use the patent-protected invention itself.” Compulsory Licensing of 
Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.htm [https://perma.cc/D2KU-6NBQ] (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2020). In the TRIPS Agreement, the country that “issues” or 
“grants” a compulsory license is the country using that patented product without 
the patent holder’s consent. See id. 
 13 TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 31(b). 
 14 See id. 
 15 See id. at art. 31(h). 
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However, developing countries have often found Article 31 
well-intentioned but impractical in use.16 In particular, countries 
with little or no resources to manufacture products remained unable 
to access the technology even though they held a compulsory 
license, due to the requirement that the drug be manufactured within 
its borders.17 In response, the WTO TRIPS council in 2003 adopted 
the amendment Article 31bis to allow exporting Member countries 
to manufacture pharmaceutical products under a compulsory license 
for an “eligible importing Member” experiencing a “national 
emergency” or “extreme urgency” in public health crises.18 
Although all countries under Article 31bis may export generic 
pharmaceuticals under a compulsory license, Members could opt 
out of qualifying as an “eligible importing Member” that may 
receive pharmaceuticals manufactured under a compulsory 
license.19 Notably, the United States, as well as Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and many countries in the European Union, have opted 
out of qualifying as an “eligible importing Member,” meaning that 
they cannot receive generic pharmaceuticals from another exporting 
Member under a compulsory license pursuant to Article 31bis.20 The 
United States’ decision to opt out as an eligible importing Member 
has been highly criticized as “shortsighted,” especially in the context 
                                                 
 16 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 
WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha 
Declaration] (acknowledging aspects of TRIPS that serve as roadblocks to 
equitable access to medicines, and reaffirming that TRIPS should “promote access 
to medicines for all”). 
 17 See id.; see TRIPS, supra note 5, at art 31(f). 
 18 See Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WTO Doc. WT/L/641 (Dec. 8 
2005) [hereinafter TRIPS, art. 31bis]; see Dawn Dziuba, TRIPS Article 31bis and 
H1N1 Swine Flu: Any Emergency or Urgency Exception to Patent Protection?, 
20 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 195, 196–97 (2011). 
 19 See TRIPS, art. 31bis, supra note 18. 
 20 Currently, thirty-seven Members of the WTO have opted out of participating 
as “eligible importing Members,” meaning that they cannot receive generic 
pharmaceuticals from eligible exporting Members. See Open Letter Asking 37 
WTO Members to Declare Themselves Eligible to Import Medicines 
Manufactured under Compulsory License in Another Country, under 31bis of 
TRIPS Agreement, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Apr. 7, 2020) [hereinafter Open 
Letter], https://www.keionline.org/32707 [https://perma.cc/HW4E-VR3W]. 
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of the COVID-19 pandemic where manufacturing capacity may fall 
short of the current crisis.21 
Despite its intended purpose to aid developing countries in their 
ability to access life-saving medicines, compulsory licenses issued 
under Article 31 or the amended Article 31bis continue to face 
significant roadblocks and international red tape since the adoption 
of TRIPS.22 In particular, it took nearly four years to provide 
Rwanda, an eligible importing Member, with generic AIDS 
pharmaceuticals via Article 31bis.23 Delays included a nearly 
two-year negotiation process between the generic manufacturer and 
patent holders, and over a year delay from when Rwanda’s 
compulsory license was issued to the delivery of the first shipment.24 
Besides the practical limitations in effectively negotiating 
compulsory licenses, some countries utilize strong-arm tactics and 
attempt to abuse the system under Article 31 and Article 31bis.25 For 
example, Brazil has issued, and threatened to issue, a compulsory 
license per Article 31 of TRIPS as a bargaining chip to lower prices 
of eligible pharmaceuticals from “Big Pharma” patent holders in the 
United States.26 The United States has also accused Thailand of 
failing to enforce intellectual property rights when the country 
applied to extend compulsory licenses of antiretroviral drug27 
                                                 
 21 See id. 
 22 See Donald Harris, TRIPS After Fifteen Years: Success or Failure as 
Measured by Compulsory Licensing, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 387–91 (2011); 
Tanya Talaga, AIDS Drugs Fiasco a Tale of Red Tape, STAR (Aug. 9, 2007), 
https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2007/08/09/aids_drugs_fiasco_a_tale_of_
red_tape.html [https://perma.cc/8N2W-FHPM]. 
 23 Harris, supra note 22, at 387–91. 
 24 Id. The entire process was so expensive and slow that the Canadian generic 
drug manufacture, Apotex, stated that it would not participate in another TRIPS 
compulsory licensing deal without future change in the legislation. 
 25 See id. at 387–88. 
 26 See id. 
 27 “Antiretroviral medications are a group of drugs that inhibit different steps in 
the HIV replication process.” Antiretroviral Therapy (anti-HIV drugs), 
HEALTHENGINE, https://healthengine.com.au/info/antiretroviral-therapy-anti-
hiv-drugs#c2 (last visited Oct. 9, 2020). 
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produced by Abbot and Merck after the patents for those drugs 
expired.28 
The name-brand pharmaceuticals currently under trial and any 
future vaccine for COVID-1929 will likely face these same 
compulsory licensing issues. Strong-arm bargaining techniques 
threatening compulsory licensing may be used to drive down the 
price of potential COVID-19 treatments. For example, if a 
pharmaceutical company patented a vaccine or pharmaceutical 
shown to be efficacious in treating or preventing COVID-19, any 
country, including middle-income countries like Brazil, could 
utilize Article 31 to issue a compulsory license without any prior 
attempts to negotiate for a voluntary license.30 Thus, the patent 
holder would receive no immediate compensation for its innovation, 
and it would also be at the mercy of the issuing Member to decide 
what constitutes “adequate remuneration” for the compulsory 
license, completely removing the patent holder’s ability to negotiate 
price.31 Often, the patent holder’s only recourse would be to seek 
review in the issuing Member’s jurisdiction.32 Moreover, the 
flexibility of Article 31 in allowing Members to issue compulsory 
licenses could expose this patent holder to multiple compulsory 
licenses issued by multiple Members without any sort of prior 
negotiation for voluntary licensing, possibly necessitating litigation 
in multiple forums.33  
Unlike prior epidemics and fatal diseases, such as SARS and 
Ebola, the current COVID-19 pandemic, with over 48 million cases 
worldwide and over one million deaths, has brought the entire globe 
                                                 
 28 Id.; Harris, supra note 22, at 387. 
 29 See Root, supra note 3. 
 30 The requirement for negotiating a voluntary license “may be waived by a 
Member in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use.” TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 
31(b). 
 31 See id. at art. 31(h). 
 32 See id. at art. 31(i), (j). Member countries may bring disputes to the Dispute 
Settlement Body of the WTO, but private entities (i.e., pharmaceutical companies) 
cannot. See Introduction to the WTO Dispute Settlement System, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/ 
c1s4p1_e.htm#parties [https://perma.cc/225P-Z9UH] (last visited Oct. 9, 2020). 
 33 See TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 31. 
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to its knees in a desperate search for an effective treatment or 
vaccine.34 Contrary to prior uses of Article 31 and Article 31bis of 
TRIPS,35 both developing countries and developed countries are 
likely to make use of compulsory licensing provisions, highlighting 
the need to reform the compulsory licensing provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement to include more specific definitions and mechanisms for 
third-party arbitration to navigate the likely complex political web 
of COVID-19 vaccine licensing requests. 
III. VACCINE NATIONALISM IN THE FACE OF COVID-19 
Despite idealistic notions that a global pandemic might inspire 
international cooperation in tandem with vaccine development, 
world superpowers such as the United States, Russia, and China, 
have stubbornly dug their heels into “vaccine nationalism.”36 Each 
nation is in the race to patent the first vaccine for COVID-19, driving 
a deeper wedge into an already deep political divide centered around 
economic dominance.37 Indeed, the anticipated life-saving vaccine 
has been dubbed “a monumental first prize for the first country able 
to manufacture it at scale,” not because of any humanitarian 
implications, but because it would grant a monopoly that “would 
allow the winner to . . . [center] the global recovery on its medical 
output.”38 
In contrast, WHO has issued a “Solidarity Call to Action” for 
countries and companies to contribute their research and data about 
the new virus to create a COVID-19 Technology Access Pool (“C-
TAP”).39 Patent pooling typically “aggregate[s patent rights] 
                                                 
 34 Statistics current as of November 7, 2020. WHO Coronavirus Disease 
(COVID-19) Dashboard, supra note 1. 
 35 See Harris, supra note 22, at 387. 
 36 “Vaccine nationalism” is a term coined by public health experts for the 
“contest of which world power can immunize its population first.” Peter Loftus & 
Drew Hinshaw, ‘Vaccine Nationalism’: A New Dynamic in the Race to Quash 
Coronavirus, WALL ST. J. (May 27, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/geopolitical-
power-play-over-coronavirus-vaccine-leaves-drugmakers-in-the-middle-
11590577849?st=s1z2sed8l3lzai5 [https://perma.cc/J8LG-KSKT]. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See Solidarity Call to Action, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (June 2020), 
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/global-research-
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amongst multiple patent holders” so that licensing fees can be 
charged for the pooled technologies, and the patent holders can be 
compensated proportionally to their contributions to the pool.40 
However, WHO’s patent pool encourages “open licenses that allow 
access [to COVID-19 IP] free of charge, use, adaptation and 
redistribution by others with no or limited restrictions.”41 Notably, 
the United States, China, and Russia have not signed this WHO-
endorsed pledge for “voluntary licensing,” reflecting the stubborn 
vaccine nationalism exhibited by each of these countries.42  
Increased tension arose in May and July of 2020, when the 
United States accused China and Russia, respectively, of stealing 
COVID-19-related research.43 These current piracy attempts 
highlight the grim reality that vaccine nationalism will likely 
complicate any potential cooperation between these countries in 
developing a vaccine, or perhaps even in negotiating cross-licensing 
arrangements if one of the above-mentioned countries develops the 
vaccine first. Thus, it seems reasonable that these countries might 
resort to retaliatory use of Article 31 in an international powerplay, 
making it imperative to ameliorate the current weaknesses in TRIPS 
to safeguard against its use as political capital.44 
                                                 
on-novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov/covid-19-technology-access-pool/solidarity-call-
to-action [https://perma.cc/2XBU-C7K3]; see COVID-19 Technology Access Pool, 
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2020), https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-
coronavirus-2019/global-research-on-novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov/covid-19-
technology-access-pool [https://perma.cc/34AZ-VNLS].  
 40 World Intell. Prop. Org., Note by the Secretariat: Patent Pools and Antitrust – A 
Comparative Analysis, at 3 (Mar. 2014), https:// www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-
competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/GVW3-SZ6K]. 
 41 Solidarity Call to Action, supra note 39. 




 43 Jenny Strasburg & Dustin Volz, Russian Hackers Blamed for Attacks on 




 44 For example, Brazil used the ambiguous terms of TRIPS to issue a 
compulsory license for Merck’s HIV/AIDS drug, even though Merck had offered 
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Regardless of respective nations’ commitment to WHO open-
licensing or, alternatively, vaccine nationalism, licensing issues will 
inevitably come to a head once a viable and marketable vaccine is 
patented. Assuming that the vaccine emerges from a country that 
has held its research close while fueled by vaccine nationalism,45 the 
international bartering scheme will likely be even more complex and 
contentious. Notably, although some companies have freely 
released licensing of their drugs of interest for use during the 
COVID-19 pandemic,46 others have doubled-down on protecting 
their rights,47 perhaps forecasting bitter compulsory licensing battles 
ahead should those drugs prove effective in treating COVID-19. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF TRIPS DEFICIENCIES AND THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF THOSE DEFICIENCIES 
Article 31 and the amended Article 31bis of TRIPS remain 
deficient in three key areas that will hinder its effective use in the 
current pandemic: (1) the vague terms in the agreement that have yet 
                                                 
a voluntary license for the drug at a 30% reduced price. Given the current climate 
of vaccine nationalism, it is not hard to imagine a retaliatory use of TRIPS for 
COVID-19 pharmaceuticals or vaccines, regardless of any voluntary license that 
may be on the table. See Jamie Feldman, Compulsory Licenses: The Dangers 
Behind the Current Practice, 8 J. INT’L. BUS. L. 137, 154 (2009). 
 45 Ana Rivas, Peter Loftus, & Alberto Cervantes, Covid-19 Vaccines: What’s 




 46 AbbVie will not enforce patent rights of HIV drug Kaletra, a drug shown to 
be promising in the treatment of COVID-19. See Ben Adams, After Kaletra 
Setback, AbbVie Joins Forces with Biotech, Academia for Experimental COVID-
19 Hopeful, FIERCE BIOTECH (June 5, 2020), https://www.fiercebiotech.com/biotec
h/after-kaletra-setback-abbvie-joins-forces-biotech-academia-for-experimental-covid-
hopeful [https://perma.cc/YV75-4ZYG]. 
 47 Gilead has applied for orphan drug designation of Remdesivir to bolster IP 
protection. See Christopher Garrison, Never Say Never – Why the High Income 
Countries that Opted-out from the Art. 31bis WTO TRIPS System Must Urgently 
Reconsider Their Decision in the Face of the Covid-19 Pandemic, MED. L. & 
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to be uniformly defined;48 (2) the lack of provisions that would 
meaningfully prevent or discourage threatening compulsory 
licensing to circumvent patent laws;49 and (3) non-uniform and 
ineffective procedures for streamlining compulsory licensing under 
Article 31bis by countries requesting generics in good faith.50 
A.  Vague Definitions 
The terms of TRIPS under Article 31 and amended Article 31bis 
provide a major roadblock in efficient enforcement of the agreement 
because these provisions lack precise definitions, leaving much to 
debate.51 For example, Article 31(b) provides that an importing 
Member may bypass any attempt to negotiate terms of a licensing 
agreement for pharmaceuticals if the Member is in a state of 
“national emergency” or “other circumstances of urgency.”52 While 
it seems obvious that a global pandemic would qualify under either 
of those terms,53 more problematic is the undefined “scope and 
duration of such use” with respect to the emergency or urgency.54 
Although the agreement provides that the license is “liable . . . to be 
terminated if and when the circumstances which led to it cease to 
exist and are unlikely to recur,” Article 31 provides no guidance in 
defining this amorphous timeframe.55 
                                                 
 48 See TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 31(b) (failing to define “national emergency” 
and “other circumstances of extreme urgency”); id. at art. 31(c) (stating that the 
“scope and duration of such use shall be limited for the purpose for which it was 
authorized”); id. at art. 31(g) (stating that “authorization for such use shall be 
liable . . . to be terminated if and when the circumstances which led to it cease to 
exist and are unlikely to recur”); id. at art. 31(h) (stating that “adequate 
remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic 
value” should be paid to the patent holders). 
 49 See generally id. at art. 31 (allowing Members to license a patented 
technology without a patent holder’s permission, but also failing to define a 
standard of “adequate remuneration” to be paid to the patent holder). 
 50 See Harris, supra note 22, at 390–91. 
 51 See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and its Contents, 60 IDEA: L. REV. FRANKLIN 
PIERCE CTR. FOR INTELL. PROP. 149, 207 (2019). 
 52 See Dziuba, supra note 18, at 196–97. 
 53 See Doha Declaration, supra note 16, ¶ 1. 
 54 See TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 31(c). 
 55 See id. at art. 31(g). 
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This lack of guidance for determining the end of an “emergency” 
creates essentially open-ended compulsory licenses.56 Considering 
that public health experts predict, even with an effective vaccine on 
hand, that the disruptive “new normal” of the COVID-19 pandemic 
will likely last for at least two years, en masse compulsory licensing 
of a patented vaccine could last for at least that long, if not longer.57 
Compulsory licensing terms for “emergencies” issued by individual 
countries with undetermined end-dates have caused political turmoil 
in the past,58 but such licensing in response to COVID-19 stands to 
have a devastating economic impact,59 considering that virtually 
every country on the globe is battling the virus simultaneously.60 
Thus, in an extreme scenario, the ultimate patent holder of a 
viable vaccine could face a globe’s worth of individual countries’ 
compulsory licensing agreements defined by vague terms. While 
pharmaceutical companies’ prior disdain for compulsory licensing 
procedures that put them at a disadvantage typically grew out of 
disputes with one country in the past, the sheer scale of this 
pandemic would likely compound those frustrations because 
companies would be simultaneously juggling compulsory licenses 
from potentially hundreds of countries.61 
                                                 
 56 See Doha Declaration, supra note 16. 
 57 Epidemiologists predict that the pandemic will persist until two-thirds of the 
world’s population has developed immunity, which could take two years. 
Localized epidemics could last longer. See Jonathan Lauerman, Covid-19 
Pandemic Likely to Last Two Years, Report Says, BLOOMBERG (May 1, 2020), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-01/covid-19-pandemic-
likely-to-last-two-years-report-says [https://perma.cc/2X6D-STPT]. 
 58 For example, the United States put Thailand on its IP watch list for Thailand’s 
use of compulsory licensing for drugs meant to treat chronic illnesses such as 
cancer and heart disease, rather than drugs for treating acute illnesses associated 
with epidemics, such as Ebola or malaria. See Harris, supra note 22, at 387. 
 59 See John LaMattina, Large R&D Investments by Big Pharma Crucial in 




 60 See WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard, supra note 1. 
 61 See Harris, supra note 22, at 387. 
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This possibility for chaos is further amplified by the ambiguous 
compensation to patent holders under a compulsory license.62 
Article 31 provides that patent holders will be “paid adequate 
remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account 
the economic value.”63 Under normal patenting circumstances 
unaffected by compulsory licensing, pharmaceutical patent holders 
stand to gain a twenty-year monopoly of their technology pursuant 
to TRIPS.64 However, that sanctioned monopoly loses value in a 
scenario where multiple countries issue compulsory licenses for the 
drug at its conception. The widespread need for a COVID-19 
vaccine,65 coupled with a possible widespread demand of 
compulsory licenses with undefined compensation schemes,66 could 
threaten a patent holder’s investment in the vaccine, which could 
cost nearly four billion dollars from research and development 
(R&D) to approval and market.67 
B.  Nefarious Use of Compulsory Licensing  
The vague definitions in Article 31 that could lead to fuzzy 
compulsory licensing time frames and compensation schemes will 
likely compound any threatened use of Article 31 in bad faith to 
drive down the price of COVID-19 pharmaceuticals. While it should 
be a goal to make curative medicines accessible to countries with a 
true need, manipulative bargaining incorporating a threatened or 
actual use of Article 31(b), like that employed by Brazil and 
Thailand in the past,68 could leave patent holders with little recourse 
in enforcing their IP rights.   
                                                 
 62 See TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 31(h). 
 63 See id. 
 64 Id. at art. 33. 
 65 George Brumfiel, Without a Vaccine, Researchers Say, Herd Immunity may 
Never be Achieved, NPR (July 24, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2020/07/24/894148860/without-a-vaccine-researchers-say-herd-immunity-
may-never-be-achieved [https://perma.cc/L284-V7BR]. 
 66 See TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 31(h). 
 67 See Dimitrios Gouglas et al., Estimating the Cost of Vaccine Development 
Against Epidemic Infectious Diseases: A Cost Minimization Study, 6 LANCET 
GLOB. HEALTH e1386, e1386 (2018). 
 68 See Harris, supra note 22, at 387–89. 
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For example, when Thailand issued a compulsory license under 
Article 31(b) for a drug to treat an illness that most would not 
consider a “national emergency,”69 the patent holder, Merck, was 
forced to argue the issue under Thai law with the Thailand 
Department of Intellectual Property pursuant to Article 31(i).70 
Article 31(i) provides that the “legal validity” of compulsory 
licenses is subject to judicial review of the Member issuing the 
license; thus, patent holders that protest compulsory licenses they 
believe to be obtained in bad faith are likely to be forced to litigate 
the issues in the Member forum exercising the threat.71 Therefore, 
patent holders may be subject to the whims of multiple countries 
choosing to wield the threat of compulsory licensing where their 
only remedy lies in the effective ad hoc adjudication by each 
Member’s interpretation of Article 31(b).  
C.  Ineffective Procedures Under Article 31bis  
Finally, Article 31bis remains ineffective,72 a problem that will 
only be exacerbated by potentially multiple importing Members 
lacking the infrastructure to manufacture COVID-19 
pharmaceuticals issuing compulsory licenses from qualifying 
exporting Members for generics. Past uses of Article 31bis have 
resulted in two-year timeframes from compulsory license issuance 
to shipment to the importing Member.73 Clearly, two years to deliver 
a COVID-19 vaccine or other pharmaceutical to any country would 
be unacceptable, and the entire world economy benefits the faster 
global immunity can be imparted.74  
                                                 
 69 See Lisa Peets & Mark Young, Is the Exception Becoming the Rule?, 195 
PATENT WORLD 21, 24 (2007), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/ 
publications/2007/09/is-the-exception-becoming-the-rule.pdf [https://perma.cc/33SH-
XAKD]. 
 70 See id.; see TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 31(i). 
 71 See TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 31(i). 
 72 See Harris, supra note 22, at 389-90. 
 73 Only Canada and Rwanda have utilized Article 31bis compulsory licensing. 
Carlos M. Correa, Will the Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement Enhance Access to 
Medicines?, S.CTR. POL’Y BRIEF, at 5 (Jan. 2019) https://www.southcentre.int/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/PB57_Will-the-Amendment-to-the-TRIPS-Agreement-
Enhance-Access-to-Medicines_EN-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7K8X-HSR5]. 
 74 See Brumfiel, supra note 65. 
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Furthermore, the United States, and other countries such as the 
United Kingdom and Australia, who are not importing Members 
pursuant to Article 31bis, are ineligible to receive generic drugs 
manufactured in exporting Members under a compulsory license 
should they find themselves unable to meet manufacturing capacity 
within their own borders.75 The United States and other countries’ 
abstention from this provision has met international criticism 
culminating in an open letter, published by Knowledge Ecology 
International in April 2020 and signed by dozens of global health 
and nonprofit organizations, requesting that the United States and 
others opt in to become an eligible importing Member.76 Although 
the United States is still eligible to export generic drugs to other 
countries,77 the letter reprimands the United States’ shortsightedness 
in assuming that importing generics from another country via 
Article 31bis would never be a necessity, regardless of the United 
States’ manufacturing capacity.78 
Effective use of Article 31bis, coupled with wealthier developed 
countries opting into importing Member-eligibility, would serve to 
expedite COVID-19 vaccine access. However, neither of these 
conditions have been met, and thus massive roadblocks may prevent 
access to vital medicines in a timely fashion. 
V. SOLUTIONS 
There are three key areas in the TRIPS Agreement that could be 
improved to enhance the treaty’s effectiveness in protecting patent 
holders’ rights and providing a workable international mechanism 
for countries to gain access to vital pharmaceuticals in pandemics 
like the current COVID-19 outbreak. These suggested 
implementations include: (1) defining terms in the TRIPS 
Agreement, specifically the scope and duration of the “emergency,” 
as well as the “adequate remuneration” to be paid to patent holders; 
(2) creating and implementing a compensation scheme whereby 
“adequate remuneration” is codified and regulated and thereby not 
                                                 
 75 See Open Letter, supra note 20; see TRIPS, art. 31bis, supra note 18. 
 76 See Open Letter, supra note 20. 
 77 See Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, supra note 12. 
 78 See Open Letter, supra note 20. 
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subject to ad hoc estimations; and (3) developing a third-party 
arbitration mechanism where compulsory licensing disputes may be 
settled outside of potentially biased importing Members’ 
adjudicatory systems. While none of these suggested 
implementations are mutually exclusive, developing a third-party 
arbitration mechanism would aid uniform adherence to any of the 
suggested amendments to the terms in TRIPS. 
A.  Defining the Emergency and Adequate Remuneration 
Defining both the scope and duration of the “emergency” and 
setting standards for “adequate remuneration” in Article 31 will be 
tantamount to streamlining the cooperation of patent holders when 
executing compulsory licenses, as well as staying potential abuses 
of TRIPS by countries simply utilizing it as a bargaining chip.79 
According to the Doha Declaration issued by the WTO in 2001 prior 
to the amendment Article 31bis, “[e]ach Member has the right to 
determine what constitutes a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency.”80 While the global pandemic 
will surely qualify as an “emergency”81 per Article 31 and Article 
31bis,82 specific definitions outlining what factors determine the 
duration of an “emergency,” and what pharmaceutical products fall 
under the scope of the “emergency” are essential to ensuring 
long-term cooperation with pharma-patent holders. 
First, the current system allowing Members to self-define both 
the scope and duration of their respective “emergencies” during the 
COVID-19 pandemic could render thousands of pharmaceuticals 
vulnerable to compulsory licensing on an unprecedented scale than 
in any previous epidemic since the adoption of TRIPS.83 Now, not 
                                                 
 79 For example, Thailand’s issuance of a compulsory license for “lifestyle” 
medications. See Peets & Young, supra note 69. 
 80 See Doha Declaration, supra note 16. 
 81 See id. (“Each Member has the right to determine what constitutes a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that 
public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, 
and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances 
of extreme urgency.”). 
 82 See id. 
 83 See WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard, supra note 1. 
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just one, but thousands of antiviral and other pharmaceutical patents 
may be subject to global compulsory licensing.84 The WTO asserted 
countries’ “right to determine what constitutes a national 
emergency”85 in response to localized epidemics affecting least-
developed nations, such as HIV/AIDS and malaria, but not with a 
globalized pandemic of the current scale in mind.86 While flexible 
definitions of an “emergency” may aid greater access to medicine 
for a few nations struggling with localized epidemics, this flexibility 
could subvert fair distribution of critical vaccines during a pandemic 
when the number of compulsory licensing requests for a vaccine 
could exceed the global supply.87 Further, without definition as to 
what qualifies under its scope, failing to limit Members’ ability to 
broadly self-define “emergency” could lend itself to nefarious 
compulsory licensing of several drugs for purposes unrelated to 
COVID-19, considering that many current pharmaceuticals under 
COVID-19 trials also have patented uses in treating other diseases.88 
On the other hand, one could argue that narrowly defining what 
constitutes the scope and duration of an “emergency” unnecessarily 
and paternalistically limits the very flexibility of TRIPS that 
safeguards less-developed countries’ ability to access medicines.89 
For example, replacing a Member’s ability to self-define 
“emergency” with a one-size-fits-all definition could fail to 
recognize individualized local concerns within that country. 
                                                 
 84 See Aude S. Peden & Antoinette F. Konski, Coronavirus Innovation 
Guideposts on the Eve of the COVID-19 Pandemic, 10 NAT. L. REV. (July 30, 
2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/coronavirus-innovation-guideposts
-eve-covid-19-pandemic [https://perma.cc/GL86-5MA3]. 
 85 See Doha Declaration, supra note 16. 
 86 See id. 
 87 Production of COVID-19 vaccines will result in heightened competition for 
resources that also manufacture other vaccines, such as those for influenza. See 
Roxanne Khamsi, If a Coronavirus Vaccine Arrives, Can the World Make 
Enough?, NATURE (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-
01063-8 [https://perma.cc/YQ8S-LJKG]. 
 88 Some antivirals manufactured to treat HIV show promise in treating COVID-
19. See Root, supra note 3. 
 89 See Doha Declaration, supra note 16; TRIPS, at art. 31, supra note 5; TRIPS, 
art. 31bis, supra note 18. 
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Further, narrowing the definition of “emergency” in the context 
of a public health crisis to meet a well-defined standard is arguably 
technically difficult with several factors at play. For example, 
whether “emergency” should be defined purely numerically, 
considering a Member’s total number of cases, death rates, infection 
rates, or by some other statistic or combination of statistics. 
Narrowing the definition of the “scope of the emergency” would 
also be technically difficult, inherently requiring some judgment as 
to what treatments fall within the scope of the emergency.90 For 
example, in the context of COVID-19, whether all antivirals and 
vaccines proven remotely efficacious in treating the virus would fall 
within the scope, or whether only the most efficacious treatments 
would qualify, would have to be decided. Even deciding whether 
only vaccines should qualify, or vaccines and other 
pharmaceuticals, would also have to be decided.91 Some Members 
may prefer certain treatments over others if those treatments are 
cheaper to manufacture, or more easily disseminated to that 
Member’s population.92  
Regardless of the understandable benefits that flexible 
self-definitions of “emergency” confer onto a Member country, the 
reality in the COVID-19 pandemic is that not just one Member, but 
all Members are experiencing an “emergency” simultaneously.93 
                                                 
 90 See Cynthia M. Ho, Patent Breaking or Balancing: Separating Strands of 
Fact from Fiction Under Trips, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 371, 405 (2009) 
(discussing the various complexities in defining the “scope” of the authorized 
purpose for a compulsory license, “[s]hould any scope that is rationally related to 
the purpose suffice?”). 
 91 See id. Article 31 as drafted does not define what drugs or other technologies 
would fall within the “scope” of an “emergency.” See TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 
31. 
 92 Many factors influence the cost to manufacture vaccines and other 
pharmaceuticals, including access to active pharmaceutical ingredients, supply of 
consumables and trained technicians, and even individual countries’ regulatory 
schemes. Wayne Winegarden, The Economics of Pharmaceutical Pricing, PAC. 
RES. INST. (June 2014); see generally Stanley Plotkin et al., The Complexity and 
Cost of Vaccine Manufacturing – An Overview, 35 VACCINE 4064, 4064 (2017) 
(detailing the costs associated with vaccine production). 
 93 There are currently over 48 million cases worldwide (as of Nov. 7, 2020). 
See WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard, supra note 1. 
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Given limited global pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity,94 
allowing any one Member to individually self-define what 
pharmaceuticals and treatments fall within the scope of its 
compulsory license for its respective “emergency” necessarily 
affects the access of those same pharmaceuticals and treatments to 
all Members, since each Member’s compulsory license is limited to 
domestic use within its own borders.95 Thus, even if it would prove 
too difficult to draft a catch-all definition of “emergency,” it 
certainly should not be left to individual Members to self-define in 
the context of a pandemic affecting substantially all, if not all, 
Members.96 Thus, at least during a globalized pandemic, it may be 
useful to reserve defining the size and scope of any particular 
Member’s “emergency” to an arbitration mechanism, although it 
may be challenging to find a disinterested third party when every 
Member has an interest in COVID-19 IP.97 
Additionally, while gating the use of compulsory licensing by 
defining “emergency” may prove too challenging, creating a 
standard definition for “adequate remuneration” to be paid to patent 
holders should at least cull any potentially nefarious uses of 
TRIPS.98 Further, a standardized definition for “adequate 
remuneration” beyond its current amorphous “economic value” 
language99 should be easier to craft than a standard definition for 
“emergency,” and is also critical to disincentivize and stymie 
countries’ illegitimate use of TRIPS to drive down pharmaceutical 
pricing.100 If “adequate remuneration” is defined and assigned a 
                                                 
 94 See Elaine Chen, Drugmakers Race to Build Covid-19 Vaccine Supply 
Chains, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/drugmakers-race-to-build-
covid-19-vaccine-supply-chains-11596101586 [https://perma.cc/9C64-3QQE], 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2020) (“Supply shortages, specialized handling and tight 
transportation capacity will make it harder to distribute hundreds of millions of 
vaccine doses.”). 
 95 See TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 31(f) (“[A]ny such use shall be authorized 
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing 
such use.”). 
 96 See WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard, supra note 1. 
 97 See id. 
 98 See Harris, supra note 22, at 387–88. 
 99 See TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 31(h). 
 100 See Harris, supra note 22, at 387–88. 
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baseline monetary value,101 Member countries simply looking to 
bypass normal contracting agreements may think twice before 
threatening compulsory licensing.  
One could imagine standardizing the value of “adequate 
remuneration” based on a Member’s Gross Domestic Product 
(“GDP”), or other measurable economic standard.102 For example, 
Brazil is the world’s ninth largest global economy in terms of 
GDP,103 yet it has threatened the use of compulsory licenses in the 
past to drive down “Big Pharma” prices in licensing negotiations.104 
Thus, if “adequate remuneration” were defined with respect to a 
country’s GDP, Brazil, for instance, may be deterred from 
threatening the use of compulsory licensing, as it would not provide 
an appreciable cost advantage. Basing a definition of “adequate 
remuneration” off of a standard like GDP may also help spread the 
cost of vital medicines and vaccines during a pandemic, where 
wealthier Members with higher GDPs would be expected to pay 
more than least-developed Members with lower GDPs. Thus, a 
standardized definition of “adequate remuneration” with respect to 
a Member’s economic ability to pay for pharmaceuticals might go 
further in ameliorating potential misuses of TRIPS in bad faith 
bargaining than an individualized review of each Members’ 
self-definitions of an “emergency” and its scope. 
However, standardizing “adequate remuneration,” even with 
respect to a Member’s individual GDP or other measurable standard, 
could fall short in reflecting a Member’s ability to pay a patent 
holder in the wake of an “emergency.”105 In other words, measuring 
                                                 
 101 See The Top 20 Economies in the World, https://www.investopedia.com/ 
insights/worlds-top-economies/#9-brazil [https://perma.cc/U8J9-CC2L] (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2020).  
 102 Arguably, there are other statistics that better gauge overall well-being of a 
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Wallis, Five Measures of Growth that are Better than GDP, WORLD ECON. 
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 103 See The Top 20 Economies in the World, supra note 101. 
 104 See Feldman, supra note 44. 
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2020” due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Global Economic Outlook During the 
COVID-19 Pandemic: A Changed World, WORLD BANK (June 8, 2020), 
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a Member’s “adequate remuneration” with respect to its economy 
before the emergency—like a measure of GDP likely would—might 
be unfair if that Member’s economy changed drastically in the wake 
of its current crisis.106 Further, regardless of what standard is used to 
measure a Member’s expected “adequate remuneration” to the 
patent holder, the base price, or “economic value,” of the 
pharmaceutical under license would still have to be determined.107 
One could certainly speculate that a patent holder’s idea of the fair 
“economic value” of a license to its pharmaceutical would be 
inflated compared to a disinterested third party. 
While it is important to consider individualized concerns that 
may not be reflected in numerical standards, measuring “adequate 
remuneration” with respect to a Member’s GDP would likely be the 
fairest estimation of any given Member’s ability to compensate the 
patent holder for their costly investment. Measuring a Member’s 
ability to adequately compensate a patent holder against an objective 
economic standard ideally would balance promoting patent holders 
to continue to invest in costly pharmaceutical research against 
individual Members’ interests and financial constraints. Investment 
in developing a treatment for any disease is a huge cost;108 thus, 
measuring “adequate remuneration” against an objective standard 
would ideally provide more protection for least-developed countries 
with weaker economies by setting a low-bar for what those 
Members would be expected to pay in terms of their actual ability 
to contribute. On the other hand, Members with strong economies 
utilizing compulsory licensing would be expected to contribute 
“adequate remuneration” closer to, or at, the sticker price in order to 
appease patent holders.  
B.  Creating and Implementing a Compensation Scheme 
There must also be a well-defined compensation scheme to pay 
patent holders an “adequate remuneration” incorporated into Article 
                                                 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2020/06/08/the-global-economic-outlook-
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 106 See id. 
 107 See TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 31(h). 
 108 Large companies such as Pfizer and Gilead have already invested upwards 
of $1 billion in COVID-19 research. LaMattina, supra note 59. 
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31, safeguarding patent holders’ costly investments in their 
products. As mentioned above, Article 31 currently provides that 
patent holders shall be paid “adequate remuneration” subsequent to 
the end of an emergency, but there is no official mechanism or plan 
whereby patent holders may seek that compensation.109 Establishing 
a uniform method of compensation would help streamline 
compulsory licensing by removing uncertainty and ad hoc 
“economic value” calculations that currently take place each time a 
country invokes a compulsory license.110 This compensation scheme 
would simultaneously provide stability for the patent holder and a 
concrete expectation of payment from the issuing country. 
While it is understandable that the WTO purposely left 
compensation mechanisms out of the agreement to serve 
humanitarian goals as flexibly as possible,111 failure to set any 
standards for compensation mechanisms ultimately burdens the 
countries this “flexibility” aspires to protect.112 In effect, failing to 
provide a compensation scheme puts the onus of navigating 
financial disputes on the countries with the least political power, 
subjecting them to political backlash and potentially less access to 
medicine in the future.113 Ideally, a compensation scheme would 
balance patent holders’ interests in maintaining profits, with 
compulsory licensees’ interests in gaining and maintaining access to 
vital medicines.  
One possible solution would be to set a standard payment 
mechanism wherein a compulsory licensee makes payments to the 
patent holder with respect to its measured “adequate remuneration” 
for that pharmaceutical. Both the determination of what the 
Member’s “adequate remuneration” to the patent holder is, and its 
payment mechanism, would likely need to be determined in some 
                                                 
 109 See TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 31(h). 
 110 See id. 
 111 See Doha Declaration, supra note 16, ¶ 4. 
 112 For example, in response to Thailand’s use of compulsory licensing, Abbott 
halted “introducing new [pharmaceuticals] to the Thai market.” See Peets & 
Young, supra note 69. 
 113 See id. 
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sort of arbitration through a third-party or the WTO.114 Ideally, this 
payment mechanism would consider the duration of the 
“emergency,” and set an appropriate timeline for installments 
against the “adequate remuneration” for that Member’s compulsory 
license. Thus, if the “adequate remuneration” is measured against a 
Member’s actual ability to compensate the patent holder, as 
discussed above,115 such a payment mechanism could actually aid 
least-developed countries by setting the license cost at a reasonable 
limit to be paid over time, while simultaneously discouraging 
nefarious uses by wealthier countries because their “adequate 
remuneration” would be higher and paid accordingly. 
Another possible solution would be to extend the lifetime of the 
patent term beyond the typical term of twenty years.116 Extending 
the patent term—and thus the patent holder’s monopoly—would 
allow the patent holder to recuperate any costs incurred under the 
compulsory license by sale of its name-brand product in other 
countries, while also serving to alleviate the financial burden on the 
compulsory licensee. However, this method of international cost-
spreading assumes that the patent holder could recuperate its costs 
under a patent term extension, and that there would be no significant 
pushback from other countries forced to effectively finance the 
compulsory licensees’ cost by accepting a longer patent term and 
thus paying name-brand prices for longer than they would otherwise 
be obligated.117 
Finally, another option for a compensation scheme, that might 
be particularly salient in the context of a pandemic, would be to 
allow the patent holder to pool compulsory licenses under a common 
agreement and designate a generic manufacturer of the patent 
holder’s choosing to make the drug. This option diverges from 
current compulsory licensing practices under both Article 31 or 
Article 31bis, where individual compulsory licensees determine 
whether to manufacture the pharmaceutical themselves or to receive 
                                                 
 114 In contrast, TRIPS currently provides that the issuing Member review “any 
decision relating” to the adequate remuneration. See TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 
31(j). 
 115 See discussion supra Part V, subsection 2. 
 116 TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 33. 
 117 TRIPS provides for a twenty-year patent term. Id. at art. 33. 
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generics from an exporting Member.118 Instead, this proposed 
compensation scheme acknowledges that there will likely be several 
compulsory licenses issued simultaneously for a given 
pharmaceutical effective in treating COVID-19, and would give the 
patent holder more control in determining the manufacture of its 
pharmaceuticals.119 While patent holders are never obligated to 
provide manufacturing to compulsory licensees under TRIPS,120 
allowing the patent holder to pool compulsory licenses could give 
the patent holder the most free-market flexibility in contracting with 
generic drug manufacturers, while also encouraging the patent 
holder to actively license its patent to other manufacturers, 
increasing the capacity and world supply of COVID-19 treatments 
or vaccines.121  
Manufacturing costs of pharmaceuticals are marginal compared 
to initial R&D investments;122 thus, if patent holders contract with 
other drug manufacturers to make their product for both free-market 
consumers and compulsory licensees, the costs could be recuperated 
in the pricing of the products for the free-market consumers.123 If 
given the option to pool compulsory licenses in this way, the patent 
holder might have an incentive to seek out large-scale 
manufacturing in order to control production costs of the 
compulsory-licensed pharmaceutical. Otherwise, compulsory 
licensees that incur their own manufacturing costs may factor those 
costs into the “economic value” of the license, and pay lower 
“adequate remuneration” to the patent holder to cover those 
expenses that were beyond the patent holder’s control.124 Thus, 
                                                 
 118 Id. at art. 31(f); TRIPS, art. 31bis, supra note 18, ¶ 1. 
 119 Currently, Member licensees manufacture compulsory licensed 
pharmaceuticals without any input from the patent holder. See TRIPS, art. 31bis, 
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 120 See id. 
 121 See generally Eileen M. Kane, Achieving Clinical Equality in an Influenza 
Pandemic: Patent Realities, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 1137, 1144 (2009) (stating 
that “[c]apacity precedes access” in a pandemic, where the “[e]ffective 
management of infectious disease is a race against time”). 
 122 See Winegarden, supra note 92, at 13. 
 123 See id. 
 124 See TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 31(h)–(j). Notably, “adequate remuneration” 
is not synonymous with monetary payment. If the licensee incurs its own 
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pooling compulsory licenses might be attractive to patent holders 
that have already invested sunk costs into manufacturing 
pharmaceuticals for free-market consumers, because they could 
simply manufacture more pharmaceuticals and ideally recuperate 
the extra cost in pricing the drugs to their free-market consumers.125 
This method of cost spreading would put the onus of covering costs 
on the patent holder; however, giving patent holders the freedom to 
contract with generic providers of their choosing should enable them 
to serve their best interests while providing equitable distribution of 
needed medicines. 
These three proposed compensation schemes—setting a 
standard payback mechanism, extending the lifetime of the patent, 
or allowing the patent holder to pool compulsory licenses—could be 
viewed as unfairly removing negotiating power from compulsory 
licensees during an emergency, thereby effectively working against 
equitable access to needed COVID-19 pharmaceuticals. For 
example, the standard payback mechanism might discourage 
Members with few resources from issuing compulsory licenses if 
that standardized “adequate remuneration” proves to be too steep a 
price. Additionally, opting to extend patent terms instead of setting 
a standardized payback mechanism could also effectively result in 
less worldwide access to vital pharmaceuticals by maintaining 
premium prices under a longer patent monopoly. Finally, the third 
option of allowing patent holders to pool compulsory licenses might 
not be utilized by patent holders if the burden of assuming 
production of compulsory licensed pharmaceuticals outweighs any 
economic benefit of controlling the production of those 
pharmaceuticals. Further, allowing patent holders to have more 
control in the distribution of their patented pharmaceuticals could 
inhibit global access to the drugs if the patent holder chooses 
                                                 
manufacturing costs, those costs would likely be taken into account when 
calculating the “adequate remuneration” owed to the patent holder. The 
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ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s9
p1_e.htm [https://perma.cc/WH4W-STGX] (last visited Oct. 9, 2020). 
 125 See Winegarden, supra note 92, at 13. 
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manufacturers that cannot reasonably produce enough drugs to meet 
the global demand.126 
The concern for matching the global demand of vital COVID-
19 pharmaceuticals has grown so much that some have argued for 
completely bypassing direct compensation to patent holders of 
COVID-19 pharmaceuticals altogether.127 Instead, governments 
would require patent holders to place their COVID-19 IP into 
mandatory patent pools (or “licensing facilities”) for any Member to 
freely access “in return for specified compensation [to the patent 
holder’s government].”128 Patent holders’ governments would then 
be paid in those patent holders’ stead, wherein royalties would be 
distributed by those governments to the patent holders.129 
Additionally, any patent holders that dispute their compensation 
through these mandatory patent pools would bring their claims in 
their own jurisdiction, wherein “compensation might be based on 
the cost to the patent owners of developing the new drugs or 
vaccines, plus a fair profit under the circumstances.”130 Proponents 
of this plan argue that mandatory patent pooling would allow for 
global equitable access to COVID-19 pharmaceuticals, enable mass 
production of those vital drugs, and still compensate patent holders 
the aforementioned royalties distributed by the patent holders’ 
governments.131  
Although mandatory patent pooling seems to balance the need 
for equitable distribution of COVID-19 pharmaceuticals while 
ideally also providing some compensation to the patent holders, the 
creation of those patent pools is entirely predicated on the utmost 
cooperation of Members to freely establish them.132 Unfortunately, 
                                                 
 126 Manufacturing capacity will already be in short supply and competing with 
resources for manufacturing other needed pharmaceuticals and vaccines. See 
Khamsi, supra note 87. 
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rampant nationalism, particularly vaccine nationalism, displayed by 
the United States, Russia, and China, does not forecast such 
broad-reaching global cooperativity.133 Accordingly, proponents of 
this plan realistically acknowledge that such mandatory patent pools 
might only be established “simply by groups of like-minded 
countries.”134 While establishing such patent pools amongst 
cooperating countries might enable greater access to COVID-19 
pharmaceuticals to Members friendly with the patent holder’s 
government, the utility of TRIPS Article 31 and Article 31bis is to 
provide access to pharmaceuticals to Members who are unable to 
establish such friendly arrangements.135 The very purpose of Article 
31 and Article 31bis is to fill the gap in protecting countries that are 
not necessarily “like-minded” to those holding the patents.136 
Further, setting up mandatory patent pools subverts patent 
protection even more than individually issuing of compulsory 
licenses per Article 31 and Article 31bis by completely removing 
any sort of bargaining power from the patent holders at the outset.137 
Moreover, creating these mandatory patent pools only transfers 
compensation pricing power from the patent holders to the 
governments, assuming that governments will more altruistically 
negotiate compensation than the patent holders themselves.138 The 
assumption that governments would provide more equitable access 
to COVID-19 pharmaceuticals than pharmaceutical companies is 
baseless, especially considering that the United States, home to 
several front-runner COVID-19 treatments,139 has openly displayed 
                                                 
local population, and there is reason to believe this will prove to be the case in the 
current pandemic.” Id. at 9. 
 133 See Loftus & Hinshaw, supra note 36. 
 134 Abbott & Reichman, supra note 127, at 10. 
 135 See TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 31(b); TRIPS art. 31bis, supra note 18. 
 136 See Doha Declaration, supra note 16, ¶ 4 (“We agree that the TRIPS 
Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to 
protect public health . . . we affirm that the Agreement can and should be 
interpreted and implemented . . . to promote access to medicines for all.”); TRIPS, 
art. 31bis, supra note 18. 
 137 See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 127, at 9–10. 
 138 See id. at 11–12. 
 139 See Root, supra note 3. 
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vaccine nationalism,140 threatened to remove funding from WHO,141 
and refused to join WHO’s open access patent pool.142  
While it would be a wonderful collaboration if all the world’s 
countries freely and openly shared COVID-19 resources and 
established these sharing facilities, it seems more practical to leave 
this distribution to the free market attenuated by the compulsory 
licensing provisions of TRIPS. Given the worldwide demand for 
COVID-19 pharmaceuticals, patent holders of efficacious 
treatments already have an incentive to contract with manufacturers 
to produce their products on a mass scale.143  
Further, establishing some sort of compensation scheme should 
help put both patent holders and potential compulsory licensees on 
notice as to what to expect financially and to plan accordingly, 
thereby helping to streamline all Members’ access to COVID-19 
pharmaceuticals. For example, without establishing some sort of 
standard compensation scheme, patent holders could likely instigate 
multiple lawsuits against Members issuing compulsory licenses if 
the patent holder objects to that Member’s chosen method of 
compensation.144 Such litigation would likely increase the price of 
COVID-19 pharmaceuticals manufactured by that patent holder, and 
divert their financial resources away from more productive uses like 
additional R&D.145 Since the COVID-19 pandemic is greatly 
                                                 
 140 See Loftus & Hinshaw, supra note 36. 
 141 “The U.S. has formally notified the World Health Organization it will 
withdraw from the United Nations agency over President Trump’s criticism of its 
ties to China . . . .” Drew Hinshaw & Stephanie Armour, Trump Moves to Pull 
U.S. Out of World Health Organization in Midst of Covid-19 Pandemic, WALL 
ST. J. (July 7, 2020, 7:46 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-says-u-
s-has-pulled-out-of-the-world-health-organization-
11594150928?st=dwtglcikzhrdm8o [https://perma.cc/D7N6-UQ6X]. 
 142 See Endorsements of the Solidarity Call to Action, supra note 42. 
 143 See Loftus & Hinshaw, supra note 36. 
 144 For example, thirty-nine pharmaceutical companies sued South Africa over 
its issuance of a compulsory license for drugs to treat AIDS. Rachel L. Swarns, 
Drug Makers Drop South Africa Suit Over AIDS Medicine, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 
2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/20/world/drug-makers-drop-south-
africa-suit-over-aids-medicine.html [https://perma.cc/M3JQ-KHG8]. 
 145 Domestic pharmaceutical patent litigation in the United States alone has a 
median cost of $2.5 million per case. Malathi Nayak, Costs Soar for Trade 
Secrets, Pharma Patent Suits, Survey Finds, BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 10, 2019, 8:01 
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affecting all countries, and not merely a handful,146 increased 
organization through a mechanized compensation scheme should 
help streamline access to these pharmaceuticals by removing some 
of the financial uncertainty. 
C.  Third-Party Arbitration of Compulsory Licensing Disputes 
Finally, at least in the context of a global pandemic, a third-party 
arbitration process to hear compulsory licensing disputes should be 
incorporated into Article 31 in order to (1) determine the validity of 
an issued compulsory license, and (2) to determine the “adequate 
remuneration” to be paid to the patent holder. Currently, Article 
31(i) and (j) respectively provide that any decision relating to the 
“legal validity” of a compulsory license, or dispute regarding 
remuneration issued under Article 31, shall be subject to judicial 
review in the compulsory licensee’s Member jurisdiction.147 
However, such judicial review processes carried out in the 
compulsory licensing Member jurisdiction, although litigated in 
their home court, have often resulted in other political 
consequences, such as trade sanctions imposed upon them by the 
unhappy patent holder’s government, thereby blocking that 
Member’s access to other medicines.148 Instead, establishing a third-
party arbitration committee to review the validity of compulsory 
licenses and to determine “adequate remuneration” should serve to 
both discourage nefarious uses of compulsory licenses, as well as 
protect the interests of compulsory licensees by settling disputes on 
neutral grounds. 
Moreover, in the context of a global pandemic where more is at 
stake than the rights of either the patent holder or any individual 
compulsory licensee, providing a third-party arbitration committee, 
outside either Member’s jurisdiction, would streamline compulsory 
license disputes more predictably and with global interests in mind. 
Establishing a third-party arbitration committee would avoid 
countries’ idiosyncratic procedural requirements and red-tape, 
                                                 
AM) https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/costs-soar-for-trade-secrets-
pharma-patent-suits-survey-finds [https://perma.cc/F4TV-DBS6]. 
 146 See WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard, supra note 1. 
 147 TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 31(i), (j); see Loftus & Hinshaw, supra note 36. 
 148 See Harris, supra note 22, at 387. 
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ideally deciding disputes more efficiently.149 Since all Members of 
the WTO are affected by this pandemic, a third-party arbitration 
would likely produce more equitable solutions for the collective 
world populace, compared to an individual country’s judicial review 
deciding disputes solely from that country’s perspective.  
On the other hand, taking judicial review out of the compulsory 
licensee Member’s jurisdiction could also effectively remove any 
bargaining power that a less-developed country might have in 
acquiring a license from an unwilling patent holder. Moreover, 
moving dispute settlement outside of a compulsory licensee’s 
jurisdiction could unfairly remove an individual Member’s right to 
negotiate its own rights in its own forum,150 as well as slow down a 
compulsory licensee’s access to the pharmaceuticals in dispute. As 
seen in past disputes, forcing patent holders to publicly litigate in 
the midst of a public health crisis in the licensee Member’s 
jurisdiction can create intense international pressure for that patent 
holder to drop the suit.151  
However, the issue at hand in the COVID-19 pandemic is not 
simply a collective of big-bully pharmaceutical companies 
hounding one developing country’s request for a compulsory license 
during a local epidemic.152 The COVID-19 pandemic has the 
potential to generate multiple such licenses to be litigated in multiple 
international venues simultaneously. Although one should rightly 
                                                 
 149 See Lucas Volman, The TRIPS Article 31 Tug of War: Developing Country 
Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical Patents and Developed Country 
Retaliation, 39–45 (2018) (LL.M. thesis, University of Dublin, Trinity College) 
(on file with author) (comparing past compulsory licensing disputes brought by 
both private pharmaceutical companies and Member governments, highlighting 
those disputes’ disparate resolutions). 
 150 For example, during the late 1990’s AIDS epidemic in South Africa, thirty-
nine pharmaceutical companies dropped their highly provocative suit against the 
South African government for issuing a compulsory license for antiretrovirals 
amidst mass protests and demonstrations. See id.; see Swarns, supra note 144. 
Arguably, removing the possibility of dispute settlement in a licensee Member’s 
jurisdiction could sanitize the process of its current heightened controversy–
certainly the optics of suing a country within its borders, currently suffering a 
health crisis, is quite different than a cleaner process of arbitration on neutral 
international grounds. See Volman, supra note 149; see Swarns, supra note 144. 
 151 See Swarns, supra note 144. 
 152 See WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard, supra note 1. 
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argue in favor of aiding least-developed countries with little 
bargaining power, the current ambiguities in the TRIPS Agreement 
and lack of official arbitration scheme tailored to compulsory 
licensing disputes make patent holders vulnerable to en masse, 
nefarious uses of compulsory licensing provisions by countries other 
than those most vulnerable.153  
One previously suggested solution advocated for utilizing the 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”)154 to convene a 
committee to hear individual compulsory licensing disputes.155 The 
DSB allows complaining Members to challenge intellectual 
property policies instituted by another Member that are allegedly 
inconsistent with the WTO Agreement.156 The dispute settlement 
process consists of a reviewing Appellate Body that decides the 
matter, and if the Body decides the policy is inconsistent with WTO 
principles, it orders that Member to remove its inconsistent policy.157 
Further, remedies such as compensation and other sanctions are 
issued only secondarily.158  
While it is certainly possible for Member governments to bring 
disputes regarding compulsory licensing before the DSB, private 
entities (i.e., pharmaceutical companies) are precluded from doing 
so, leaving those companies with no recourse but to sue in the 
adversary Member’s jurisdiction.159 Moreover, any “compensation” 
                                                 
 153 For example, Brazil issued a compulsory license of a drug despite its own 
strong economy and favorable negotiations for a voluntary license with Merck, 
who offered a 30% discount. See Feldman, supra note 44. One could imagine 
similar nefarious uses during the current pandemic. 
 154 WTO Bodies Involved in the Dispute Settlement Process, WORLD TRADE 
ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c3s1p1_
e.htm [https://perma.cc/PU7C-JXVF] (last visited Oct. 9, 2020) (“The DSB has 
the authority to establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain 
surveillance of implementation of rulings and recommendations and authorize the 
suspension of obligations under the covered agreements [including TRIPS].”). 
 155 See Ann Marie Effingham, TRIPS Agreement Article 31(b): The Need for 
Revision, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 883, 907 (2016). 
 156 See WTO Bodies Involved in the Dispute Settlement Process, supra note 154. 
 157 See id. 
 158 See id. 
 159 Introduction to the WTO Dispute Settlement System, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c1s4p1_e.
htm#parties [https://perma.cc/889C-AMML] (last visited Oct. 9, 2020) (“Since 
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ordered by the WTO to the complaining party does not come in the 
form of monetary payment, but instead as a “benefit” such as tariff 
reduction by the respondent to nullify its ill use of WTO measures.160 
Thus, pharmaceutical companies holding patents to COVID-19 
vaccines or pharmaceuticals currently cannot obtain remedies from 
the WTO.161 
Thus, one possible solution to balance the needs of 
least-developed countries with those of patent holders, combined 
with an initiative to deter nefarious uses of TRIPS Article 31, 
requires creating a specialized arbitration committee to process 
compulsory licenses from issue to manufacture. Especially in light 
of the foreseeability of compulsory licensing disputes over 
COVID-19 pharmaceuticals, it seems pivotal to create an arbitration 
mechanism within the WTO DSB to exclusively address these 
claims and streamline resolution. 
Although Article 31 currently allows Members to issue 
compulsory licenses without any initial third-party review,162 it 
seems warranted in a pandemic to require Members to submit a 
report detailing their need for compulsory licenses of COVID-19 
pharmaceuticals to this specialized arbitration committee. This 
proposed committee could hear answers from private patent holders 
disputing the compulsory licenses, and then issue an opinion on the 
fairness of the compulsory license and what “adequate 
remuneration” would be in that case.163 If the committee determined 
                                                 
only WTO Member governments can bring disputes, it follows that private 
individuals or companies do not have direct access to the dispute settlement 
system, even if they may often be the ones (as exporters or importers) most 
directly and adversely affected by the measures allegedly violating the WTO 
Agreement.”). 
 160 The Process – Stages in a Typical WTO Dispute Settlement Case, supra note 
124 (“This compensation does not mean monetary payment; rather, the respondent 
is supposed to offer a benefit, for example a tariff reduction, which is equivalent 
to the benefit which the respondent has nullified or impaired by applying its 
measure.”). 
 161 See id. 
 162 See TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 31(b). 
 163 Introduction to the WTO Dispute Settlement System, supra note 159 
(“According to WTO jurisprudence, panels and the Appellate Body [of the DSB] 
have the discretion to accept or reject these submissions [of amicus curiae from 
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the compulsory license to be nefarious, it could ask the issuing 
Member to revoke the license and resume negotiating for a 
voluntary license. 
Although requiring a committee to review a compulsory license 
prior to its issue would necessarily slow down the process by which 
any one Member accesses vital COVID-19 pharmaceuticals, it 
would also serve to protect the interests of all Members that will 
need the same pharmaceuticals in the wake of this pandemic.164 
Again, and especially in the context of already-displayed vaccine 
nationalism, it is critical to have a process streamlining global 
disputes related to COVID-19 pharmaceuticals to encourage both 
legitimate uses of compulsory licensing and discourage any 
potentially nefarious uses in response to vaccine nationalism. 
Overall, such an arbitration mechanism might balance the needs of 
legitimate uses of TRIPS by least-developed Members with the 
needs of patent holders, while simultaneously weeding out nefarious 
uses of the treaty. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The COVID-19 pandemic presents the international community 
with an opportunity to address longstanding deficiencies in TRIPS 
to provide more efficient and equitable distribution of life-saving 
pharmaceuticals. Although flexibility was intentionally conferred to 
individual Members in their use of the compulsory licensing 
provisions of TRIPS, these goals were initially framed in the context 
of localized epidemics. While flexibility in issuing compulsory 
licenses for pharmaceuticals may arguably best serve the needs of 
individual Members, the potential for en masse compulsory 
licensing in a globalized pandemic threatens the collective needs of 
all Members. 
                                                 
non-governmental organizations], but are not obliged to consider them.”). This 
Article advocates for private patent holders’ submissions on the fairness of any 
given compulsory license for COVID-19 pharmaceuticals to be considered in 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings. See id.  
 164 The widespread nature of COVID-19 still persists as of November 2020. See 
WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard, supra note 1. 
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As such, this Article has identified three key areas in which 
TRIPS can be refined to address the current global needs: 
(1) incorporating more specific definitions and standards with 
respect to compulsory licensing; (2) implementing a standard 
compensation scheme to pay patent holders “adequate 
remuneration;” and (3) employing a third-party arbitration 
mechanism to streamline global disputes relating to COVID-19 
pharmaceuticals and compulsory licensing. Although each of these 
three proposed solutions would serve to initially restrict individual 
Members’ flexibility to issue compulsory licenses, each of these 
proposed solutions should help guard the interests of all TRIPS 
Members while simultaneously serving the goals of TRIPS: 
encouraging patent holders’ costly investments into life-saving 
treatments while providing for their fair and equitable global 
distribution.  
